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The
First Anglo-Sikh War
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| Sikh Missionary
Society: Resource Centre: The First
Anglo-Sikh War
The First Anglo-Sikh War
(“The First Anglo-Sikh War”
Author: Amarpal Singh Sidhu
Foreword by Professor Peter Doyle, Battlefield Archaeologist.)
This is the first study of its type, which uses battlefield archaeology
to give a graphic account of the battles fought during the First
Anglo-Sikh War. The terrain and landmarks of each battlefield are
described in detail “to give a comprehensive vision of the
battlefield”. Satellite imagery on Google Earth has been used and
there are many battlefield sketches and photographs.
This pioneering methodology also invites similar studies of other
Indian battlefields. As Prof. Peter Doyle writes in his foreword
to this excellent book by Amarpal Singh Sidhu, “Battlefield archaeology
has grown out of a need to reinterpret battlefields, to place them in
their correct geographic setting, to understand the events that were
played out in past wars…”.
In addition to Indian sources, much new unpublished information,
such as first hand accounts, maps and letters from that period over the
last 100 years, has been included from UK sources such as the National
Army Museum, British Library and a few other museums.
And so, the reader is given a tour of each battlefield as he retraces
the clash between two great armies from 18 December 1845 to 10 February
1846. The stakes were high: loss of sovereignty for the
Sikh state, or the end of colonial rule in India.
There are many well researched books written in recent years of the
chaotic period after Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s death (27 June 1839) and
the two Anglo-Sikh Wars ending in the annexation of Punjab by the
British in 1849. However, my question, “Why yet another
book?”, is answered by the author in his preface, “Appreciation
of the battlefields is important. No other single event can decide the
fate of countries and nations in more dramatic fashion than trial of
strength over a few square kilometres of often uncompromising
land. Few other events are more galling than the loss of
independence suffered after a defeat. On the battlefield are
displayed the highest human qualities of bravery, camaraderie, and
loyalty and also the basest vices of treachery and cowardice.”
In the introductory pages, the author done a concise analysis of the
events which led to the First Anglo-Sikh War and the battles of Mudki,
Ferozeshah, Bhudowal, Aliwal and the “slaugher” of the retreating Sikh
army at Sabraon.
Clash between two great armies in India in the first half of the 19th
century, was inevitable. The British colonial administrators and
generals were waiting for the right opportunity but, for reasons
discussed, they were in no hurry. “The pact of 1809 proved useful
to the British because the powerful Sikh army was controlling the
turbulent tribesmen in the north and west’ while “British rule was over
the more placid states”. Therefore, “the Sikh empire provided
security for the territories of the East India Company at no cost to
the company itself.”
Meanwhile, the Sikh army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s kingdom, north of
Sutlej River, was not quite ready to take on a well disciplined
colonial force maintained entirely at the expense of the subdued rulers
of India through the devise of “Subsidiary Alliance”. In
fact, until Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s death, the waiting game was of
mutual benefit to both sides.
The intrigue and treachery at Lahore Darbar following the death of
Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and the subsequent loss of control over the Sikh
soldiery, changed the mutual benefit equation. By 1945, the clash
between British raj and Khalsa raj, which was inevitable, became
imminent.
Following years of strife at Lahore after Maharaja Ranjit Singh,
the Sikh generals had lost control over the army which elected
“punchayats” and held ultimate power. The soldiers “went on
vendettas or carried out looting”, and remained away from
cantonments without leave for long periods. Taxes could not be
collected and the treasury was empty.
The British too were getting regular reports of the events at Lahore
and continued to make necessary preparations e.g. 60 iron boats were
constructed at Bombay and brought to Khunda ghat near Ferozepore,
so that these could be used to construct a double bridge across Sutlej
when required. In March 1945, Raja Gulab Singh of Kashmir
(influential at Lahore) had already written to the British Governor
General to invade Punjab. “This would not be a war of conquest,
however, but one organised specifically to annihilate the recalcitrant
Sikh army.”
This plan was communicated in advance to the British and full
support offered by Raja Gulab Singh, and in the battlefields, by Tej
Singh Commander-in-Chief of the Sikh army and Lal Singh the Vizier or
Prime Minister, who was second in command. None of the three were Sikh
or even Punjabi.
With assurance of support from the treacherous triumvirate, British
provocations and intrusions into Lahore territory became bolder as the
British also continued to build up their border force. Finally,
seizer of two villages in November 1845 by Major Broadfoot, the British
agent at Ludhiana, probably sparked the first Anglo-Sikh War.
On the 11 December 1845, the Sikh army of 35 to 40 thousand crossed
Sutlej with 150 guns. However, the army remained in defensive
positions and within Lahore territory south of Sutlej. Even after
declaring war, Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, had
doubts about the legality, and rights and wrongs of the British
campaign as he confided to his staff at Mudki, the site of the opening
battle. It is significant that, despite provocation, the large
Sikh army did not attack Ferozepore, and adopted a defensive position
at Ferozeshah.
The Sikh army was divided into four separate contingents (including the
one at Philaur), and kept waiting in defensive positions until
the British were able to build up their attacking forces. As
promised by the traitors at Lahore, throughout the War, British would
be kept well informed about battle plans, deployment of forces,
entrenchments and weaknesses in defences.
The book is in two parts: First part gives a systematic account
of each battle. Strength and military formations of opposing forces,
the battle itself, casualties and the aftermath of each battle, are
based on original records and eyewitness evidence pieced together
painstakingly. Clear description of the terrain is given and the
detail about military units deployed on both sides, their locations and
part played in each battle, is most remarkable.
The second part gives battlefield guides and locations of places of
interest on, and near, the battlefields.
And so each battle is brought to life. Soldiers on both sides
showed incredible bravery. None asked for mercy and no mercy was
shown.
Both, Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor General of India, an
experienced military man himself, and Sir Hugh Gough
Commander-in-Chief, were present at the main battles of Mudki,
Ferozeshah, and Sabraon.
Due to well planned attacks by the British force with detailed
knowledge of Sikh defences and weak points, the battles
themselves were quite short. Sabraon, the last battle, was around 4
hours, Aliwal around 2-3 hours, Bhudowal even less. Only Mudki and
Ferozehshah, the opening battles, lasted around 8-9 hours. It was
mainly due to the Sikh commanders always keeping the Sikh army in
a defensive position and not advancing during a British retreat
that battles like Ferozeshah and Bhudowal ended prematurely.
Despite a much longer supply line, compared with the Sikh army, the
British had better field intelligence and communication; their smaller
numbers were deployed more efficiently, their battlefield tactics were
better than the leaderless Sikh army; and they kept in battle
formations and showed readiness to attack. The Sikh army remained
divided and on the defensive and hardly used the cavalry.
The author has shown how opportunities to destroy the British army were
missed by the Sikh commanders. With better military intelligence,
some highly vulnerable targets like Ludhiana and Ferozepore with small
contingents, and the military supply train from Delhi, could have been
destroyed almost at the outset of hostilities, and even the capture of
Delhi was well within Sikh grasp. Loss of confidence in the
British invincibility would have brought forward the 1857 Indian mutiny.
The treachery of Tej Singh and Lal Singh claimed something like 10,000
lives at Sabraon where a single lane boat bridge had been partly
destroyed by Lal Singh and Tej Singh “taking precaution to first retire
across it themselves, their object being to effect, as far as possible,
the annihilation of the feared and detested army.” (William Edwardes,
Under Secretary to the British Government). As Gough and Hardinge
watched the Sabraon battle from a watchtower at Rhodewalla village,
Hardinge reminded a British officer, Thackwell, riding past, “When you
get into the entrenchment, don’t spare them”.
The cavalry charge by Sardar Sham Singh Attariwala at Sabraon is
described by eyewitnesses. Dressed in white, he mounted his horse
“Shah Kabutar” and rallying 50 cavalrymen behind him he charged HM 50th
Regiment on the British left. “He was later found riddled with seven
shots. Hardinge later compared his attack to that of the Light Brigade,
writing that “with Sham Singh fell the bravest of the Sikh generals.”
Gough’s pre-battle order not to spare any Sikh soldiers was carried out
ruthlessly. “Now and then a few [Sikh soldiers] turned and rushed at us
with their tulwars only to be caught on our bayonets or to be shot
down. The slaughter was terrible.” (Pte Joseph Hewitt 62nd
Foot). It is not clear if the Sikh soldiers had run out of
ammunition at this stage.
In this war, the British captured a total number of 320 guns of which
80 guns “had a bigger calibre than anything seen in Europe.”
This study is a milestone achievement for Sikh historiographers in the
comparatively new discipline of battlefield archaeology. It gives
much new material for military analysts, historiographers, serious
students of Sikh history and lay readers and tourists interested in
understanding the battles in the First Anglo-Sikh War.
The book is well written. Perhaps the author could have given
modern spellings for the names of some villages and places mentioned in
the book.
Gurmukh Singh (U.K.)
- sewauk2005@yahoo.co.uk
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